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STANDARDS FOR ACCEPTING GUILTY PLEAS TO
MISDEMEANOR CHARGES
The guilty plea-not the trial-is the most common manner of dis-
posing of criminal cases in America. It has been estimated that 90 per-
cent of all convictions and 95 percent of misdemeanor convictions are
the result of guilty pleas.1 Various reasons have been advanced to
explain this heavy reliance on the guilty plea. For example, it avoids
the drain on judicial resources that would occur if all cases had to be
tried.2 In addition, it eliminates the risks and uncertainties of trials
3
and permits flexibility in sentencing.' Because of the prevalence of
guilty pleas, there must be procedural safeguards to insure that de-
fendants are treated fairly.
It has long been established that, in order to be valid, a guilty plea
must be entered voluntarily and understandingly.' Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that a guilty plea is invalid if it is entered as the result
of threats, intimidation, or other forms of coercion6 or as a result of
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL
3 & n. 1 (1966); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS]. The percentage for felony cases taken alone is somewhat lower-70
to 85 percent. D. NEWMAN, supra, at 3 n.L.
2 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 135 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY].
As a practical matter, many courts could not sustain the burden of having to try
all cases coming before them. The quality of justice in all cases would suffer if
overloaded courts were faced with a great increase in the number of trials.
Tremendous investments of time, talent, and money, all of which are in short




I Id.; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited
as ABA STANDARDS]. It has often been said that defendants who plead guilty receive more
lenient sentencing treatment than those who are tried and convicted. ABA STANDARDS § 1.8
(a) states that it is proper for a court to grant charge and sentence concessions to defendants
who plead guilty "when the interest of the public in the effective administration of criminal
justice would thereby be served." It then lists six factors that a court is to take into account in
deciding this question. However, some courts and commentators have been highly critical of
granting leniency to those who plead guilty, because such leniency in effect penalizes those
who assert their right to trial. See People v. Earegood, 12 Mich. App. 256, 162 N.W.2d 802
(1968); Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).
See, e.g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1927).
6 E.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101
(1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
The type of coercion which would invalidate a guilty plea does not include the pressure that
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ignorance or misapprehension.7 In Boykin v. Alabama,s there were
no allegations that the defendant's guilty plea resulted from mis-
apprehension or any form of coercion, but the Supreme Court struck
down the plea involved because the record failed to show affirmatively
that it was voluntarily and understandingly entered.9 The Court held
that it could not presume from a silent record that a guilty plea was
entered voluntarily and knowingly.'" It emphasized that the trial judge
must employ the utmost solicitude in "canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea
connotes and of its consequence[s]."' 1 This requirement is intended to
provide an additional procedural safeguard for the accused and an
adequate record for appellate review.'"
a defendant may feel to plead guilty in order to avoid the possibility of a heavier sentence
being imposed upon conviction following ajury trial. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
1 E.g., Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
Thus, a defendant's conviction is invalid where he consented to a "prima facie" trial in
ignorance of the fact that this was the practical equivalent of a guilty plea. Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1 (1966). On the other hand, the defendant's plea is not invalidated by his ignorance
of the legal sufficiency of his defenses. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
8 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
" The Court stated, "So far as the record shows, the judge asked no questions of petitioner
concerning his plea, and petitioner did not address the court." Id. at 239.
10 The Court indicated that a guilty plea involved the waiver of three important constitu-
tional rights: the right of confrontation, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to a
jury trial. Therefore, the Court would not "presume a waiver of these three important federal
rights from a silent record." Id. at 243 (footnote omitted). See text accompanying note 31
infra. For a consideration of Boykin in terms of principles governing the waiver of constitu-
tional rights, see The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 181-87 (1969); Note,
Criminal Procedure: Effects of a Plea of Guilty on a Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 27
OKLA. L. REV. 49 (1974); 22 ALA. L. REV. 76 (1969).
I 395 U.S. at 244. Justice Harlan in a dissent suggested that
The Court thus in effect fastens upon the States, as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, the rigid prophylactic requirements of Rule II of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Id. at 245. Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part, that a court
shall not accept a guilty plea ... without first addressing the defendant person-
ally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea .... The Court shall not
enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual
basis for the plea.
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467-68 n.20 (1969), the phrase, "understanding
of the nature of the charge," was construed to mean that the trial judge must make sure that
the defendant understands the essential elements of the offense with which he is charged, at
least in those cases in which the charge encompasses lesser included offenses.
The requirements which the Supreme Court imposed upon the states in Boykin are similar
to the requirements of Rule I 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but it is unclear
whether all the requirements of Rule 11, with the gloss put on it by McCarthy, are constitu-
tionally mandated. Some state courts have held that Federal Rule II is now obligatory on the
states. E.g., Bishop v. Langlois, 106 R.I. 56, 256 A.2d 20 (1969); Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d
661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969). Others have held that not all the requirements of Federal Rule II
are constitutionally mandated. E.g., Byler v. State, -Ark.-, 513 S.W.2d 801 (1974); Boyd
v. State, 255 So. 2d 705 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971).
12 395 U.S. at 243-44. There is a split among state courts about whether an appellate court
can look only to the record created by the trialjudge at the time that a guilty plea is entered to
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The defendant in Boykin pleaded guilty to a serious felony and was
sentenced to death. 13 This article will examine the constitutional and
policy considerations which suggest the application of Boykin to mis-
demeanors 4 and will consider whether the procedures developed to
implement the Boykin principle in felony cases should likewise be
followed in misdemeanors.
I. STANDARDS FOR ACCEPTING GUILTY PLEAS
IN FELONIES
While the Supreme Court in Boykin indicated that there must be
an affirmative showing in the record that a guilty plea is voluntarily
and understandingly entered, it gave only a general indication of how
the trial court is to assemble this record. A large number of state and
lower federal court opinions 15 have considered what specific inquiries
the trial court must make before the defendant's plea is accepted.
16
These inquiries can be grouped into five main areas, at least some of
which are required by all courts.
determine compliance with Boykin or whether it can look also to the record as reconstructed
at a post-conviction hearing. Some courts have reversed convictions when the record created
at the time the plea was entered failed to show compliance with the Boykin requirements,
thereby allowing the defendant to plead anew. See, e.g., People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal. 3d 480,
498 P.2d 992, 102 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1972); Higby v. Sheriff of Clark County, 86 Nev. 774, 476
P.2d 959 (1970). Some other courts have held that it is permissible to look to the entire record
as reconstructed at a post-conviction hearing. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 287 A.2d 592 (Me.
1972); Vickery v. State, 258 S.C. 33, 186 S.E.2d 827 (1972). There is language in the Boykin
opinion to support both views. The former is supported by the statement in Boykin that the
procedure set forth is designed to forestall "the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to
probe murky memories." 395 U.S. at 244. The latter group of courts is supported by a
passage in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), dealing with the waiver of the right
to counsel, which the Court inBoykin quotes with approval: "The record must show, or there
must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused . . . intelligently and
understandingly rejected" an offer of counsel. 395 U.S. at 242.
,3 395 U.S. at 239-40. The defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of common law robbery.
14 There are significant variations among the states in the manner in which offenses are
classified as misdemeanors or felonies. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in
Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 64-67
(1963). However, the standard that has been most widely adopted is that a misdemeanor is an
offense punishable by not more than one year's imprisonment. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.05, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). Therefore, the term misdemeanor in this article
will be used to refer to offenses punishable by afine or imprisonment not exceeding a term of
one year.
'5 The emphasis in this part will be on state rather than federal cases, since the vast bulk of
criminal prosecutions are brought in state courts.
Some of the procedures discussed in this section are themselves constitutionally man-
dated, while others have been adopted as a policy matter as being the most desirable means of
creating the constitutionally required record of voluntariness and understanding.
16 Recent articles that deal with acceptance of guilty pleas include Bishop, Guilty Pleas in
Missouri, 42 U. Mo. KAN. C. L. REV. 304 (1974); Bishop, Guilty Pleas in the Pacific West, 51
J. URBAN L. 171 (1973); Bishop, Guilty Pleas in Texas, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 301 (1972);
Bishop, Rights and Responsibilities of the Defendant Pleading Guilty, 49 J. URBAN L. 1
(1971); Davis, The Guilty Plea Process: Exploring the Issues of Voluntariness andAccuracy,
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The first area of inquiry concerns the defendant's understanding of
the nature of the charge. It is widely accepted that the defendant must
at least be informed of the nature of the charge against him." This
is most often accomplished by the reading of the statutory violations
charged in the indictment or information.'8 However, some appellate
courts have held that the defendant must also be advised of the essen-
tial elements of the offense.19 On the other hand, most courts which
have considered the question have held that it is not necessary to
advise the defendant about possible defenses.
2 0
A second area of inquiry is to determine the voluntariness of the
plea. Most jurisdictions require such an inquiry to be made by the
trial court before it accepts a plea.2' The trial judge will most frequent-
ly ask the defendant whether his plea has been induced in any way
6 VAL. U.L. REV. 111 (1972); Erickson, The Finality of a Plea of Guilty, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 835 (1973); Heberling, Judicial Review of the Guilty Plea, 7 LINCOLN L. REV. 137
(1972); Note, Post-Conviction Relieffrom Pleas of Guilty: A Diminishing Right, 38 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 182 (1971); Comment, Pleas of Guilty, 18 KAN. L. REV. 729 (1970); Comment,
Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas, 48 N.C.L. REV. 352
(1970); Note, The TrialJudge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness and Understanding of Guilty
Pleas, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 289; Comment, Profile of a Guilty Plea: A Proposed Trial Court
Procedure for Accepting Guilty Pleas, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1195 (1971).
'7 See, e.g., In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 911 (1970); Purvis v. Connell, 227 Ga. 764, 182 S.E.2d 892 (1971); State v. Sisco, 169
N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969); State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d763 (1971); Bishop v.
Langlois, 106 R.I. 56, 256 A.2d 20 (1969); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 1 l(c)(l); ARz. R. ClM. P.
17.2; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(c)(1); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 11; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.170(a);
IDAHO CRIM. PRAC. & PROC. R. 11; ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)(1); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1204(a)
(Bums Cum. Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210(3) (1974); KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.08; ME.
R. CRIM. P. 11; MICH. GEN. CT. R. 785.7(1)(a); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.04; MoNT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 95-1606(e) (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(1) (1973); N.J. CRIM. PRAC. R. 3:9-2;
OHIO R. CRIM. P. I I(C)(2)(a); ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.385(1) (1974); VT. R. CRIM. P.
I1 (c)(I); VA. R. CRIM. PRAC. & PROC. 3A: l(c); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.2(d); WiS.
STAT. ANN. § 971.08(1)(a) (1971); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 15. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 1.4(a).
s See Comment, Profile of a Guilty Plea: A Proposed Trial Court Procedurefor Accepting
Guilty Pleas, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1195, 1216 (1971).
19 See, e.g., People v. Cumby, 495 P.2d 225 (Colo. 1972); People v. Hudson, 7 111. App. 3d
800, 288 N.E.2d 533 (1972); State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968). Contra,
State v. Howell, 109 Ariz. 165, 506 P.2d 1059 (1973); Moore v. State, 496 S.W.2d 810 (Mo.
1973).
20 See, e.g., People v. Hickey, 110 Ariz. 527, 521 P.2d 614 (1974); People v. Green, 21
Mich. App. 188, 175 N.W.2d 235 (1970).
21 See, e.g., Purvis v. Connell, 227 Ga. 764, 182 S.E.2d 892 (1971); State v. Sisco, 169
N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969); Alexander v. State, 226 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1969); Bishop v. Langlois,
106 R.I. 56, 256 A.2d 20 (1969); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 11 (d); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.3; COLO. R.
CRIM. P. 1 I(c)(2); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 11; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.170(a); IDAHO CRIM.
PRAC. & PROC. R. 11; ILL. S. CT. R. 402(b); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1205(a) (Bums Cum. Supp.
1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210(3) (1974); KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.08; ME. R. CRIM. P. Ii; MICH.
GEN. CT. R. 785.7(2); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.04; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1606(e) (1969);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035(1) (1973); N.J. CRIM. PRAC. R. 3:9-2; OHIO R. CRIM. P.
II(C)(2)(a); ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.390(l) (1974); PA. R. CRIM. P. 319(a); VT. R. CRIM. P.
I l(d); VA. R. CRIM. PRAC. & PRoc. 3A: I1(c); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.2(d); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 971.08(l)(a) (1971); WYo. R. CRIM. P. 15. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. Ii; ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 1.5.
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by threats or promises.22 Realizing that such an inquiry may be mean-
ingless if the defendant is attempting to hide the fact that he has
entered into a plea bargain with the prosecution,2 3 several jurisdictions
have recently adopted a requirement that such bargains be expressly
stated in the record.
2 4
A third area of inquiry involves the defendant's understanding of
the consequences of his plea. Many jurisdictions require that the
defendant be advised of the maximum sentence that could be imposed
for the offense to which he is pleading guilty. 5 However, there is
substantial disagreement about whether the defendant must be advised
that he will become ineligible for parole2 6 or be subject to special
22 See D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 27.
23 Some commentators have contended that plea bargaining is unconstitutional, arguing
that pleas entered as a result of such bargaining are necessarily coerced and hence do not
comply with the constitutional requirements of voluntariness. See Note, The Unconstitu-
tionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970). However, in recent decisions,
the Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned the use of plea bargaining and has indicated that
plea bargaining is not inherently coercive. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Santobello, the Court commented that" 'plea
bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly adminis-
tered, it is to be encouraged." 404 U.S. at 260.
214 See, e.g., Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1973); People v. West, 3 Cal.
3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970); Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 276
A.2d 526 (1970); ALASKA R. CmdM. P. 11(e); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4; ILL. S. CT. R. 402(d);
MICH. GEN. CT. R. 785.7(2); OHIO R. CRIM. P. II(F); VT. R. CRIM. P. 11(e); WASH.
SUPER. CT. CiuM. R. 4.2(e). See also PROPOSED FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 52 F.R.D. 409, 416-17
(1971); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 1.5. This development has been welcomed by
commentators, one of whom noted,
The arguments supporting open examination of the defendant's plea bargain at
his plea colloquy go directly to the twin themes ofjudicial control and judicial
credibility in the plea process. Full public disclosure of the bargain and its
terms will go far toward judicial elimination of misunderstandings between the
defendant and defense counsel over the implications of a plea agreement....
And, since it is no longer necessary for counsel to rehearse the defendant or
forewarn him against controverting what is said by others during the colloquy,
the trial judge will be better able to control the plea process through his inquiry
into the voluntariness of the plea and influence of the plea bargain.
Heberling, supra note 16, at 201-02 (footnote omitted).
A further issue beyond the scope of this article is whether plea bargaining in itself is
desirable. Fora discussion of the relevant considerations, see Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty
Plea, 374 ANNALS 70 (1967); White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1971).
25 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 440 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1971); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d
542 (Iowa 1969); Mathews v. State, 15 Md. App. 686, 292 A.2d 131 (1972); ALASKA R. CRIM.
P. 1 l(c)(3)(i); ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)(2); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1204(d) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1974);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210(2) (1974); MICH, GEN. CT. R. 785.7(1)(b); OHIO R. CRIM. P.
ll(C)(2)(a); ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.385(2)(b) (1974); VT. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2). But see
Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 451 Pa. 458, 304 A.2d 108 (1973); State v. White, 5 Wash. App.
615, 489 P.2d 934 (1971).
A similar requirement is for the defendant to be advised of any mandatory minimum. See,
e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. I l(c)(3)(i); ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)(2); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1204(d)
(Bums Cum. Supp. 1974); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 785.7(l)(b); VT. R. CRIM. P. I1(c)(2).
26 Some courts have held that the trial court should advise the defendant if he is ineligible
for parole under the offense he is pleading guilty to. See, e.g., Berry v. United States, 412
F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969); Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1969). Other courts
have regarded parole as a matter of "legislative grace" and have therefore held that it is not
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sentencing possibilities as a result of the plea.17 On the other hand,
most courts have held that it is not necessary to advise the defendant
as to possible collateral consequences of his conviction such as loss of
a passport,28 loss of the right to vote,2" or deportation. 30
A fourth area of inquiry involves the defendant's waiver of consti-
tutional rights. The Supreme Court in Boykin indicated that a guilty
plea involves the waiver of three important constitutional rights: the
right to a jury trial, the right of confrontation, and the privilege against
self-incrimination. 3. Courts have split on whether the trial court must
expressly advise the defendant about these rights. Some have held
that on-the-record waivers of these rights are unnecessary 32 since the
Boykin Court did not explicitly make them a requirement. Other
courts have found that the clear implication of Boykin is to require
on-the-record waivers of the constitutional rights enumerated. 33 A few
necessary to advise a defendant of his ineligibility for parole. See, e.g., Smith v. United
States, 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Anushevitz v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 86 Nev. 191,
467 P.2d 115 (1970).
27 Special sentencing statutes are statutes such as youth offender acts and recidivist
statutes which impose a penalty separate from that provided by the statute punishing the
substantive offense charged. See Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness
and Understanding of Guilty Pleas, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 289, 318-19. It has been held that a
defendant must be advised of the special sentencing provisions of the Federal Youth Correc-
tions Act. 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq. (1970). Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir.
1963). However, it has been held that it is not necessary to advise a defendant that his guilty
plea might subject him to a civil commitment hearing under defective delinquent acts.
Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973); Perry v. State, 11
Md. App. 302, 273 A.2d 635 (1971).
28 E.g., Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916
(1965).
29 E.g., United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963); People v. Thomas, 41 I11. 2d
122, 247 N.E.2d 177 (1968).
30 E.g., United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d
247 (Alas. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973). The Tafoya court explained why appellate
courts are reluctant to require trial judges to advise a defendant of collateral consequences:
It would indeed be onerous and absurd to require the trial judge to delve into all
the pecularities of each defendant's birth, nationality, occupation, and other
circumstances, and to apprise him of all the collateral consequences possibly
flowing therefrom.
Id. at 251. See generally Note, The Rational Basis for Guilty Pleas and the Restrictive Scope
of Direct Consequences, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 236 (1974).
3' 395 U.S. at 243.
32 See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 254 So. 2d 22 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971); Commonwealth v. Morrow,
-Mass.-, 296 N.E.2d 468(1973); Turner v. State, 493 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); State
v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971); Heffley v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 89
Nev. 573, 516 P.2d 1403 (1973); Tipton v. State, 498 P.2d 429 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1972).
13 See, e.g., In re Tahl, I Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969); Thomas v.
State, -Ind. App.-, 306 N.E.2d 136 (1974); English v. State, 16 Md.'App. 439, 298 A.2d 464
(1973); People v. Jaworski, 387 Mich. 21, 194 N.W.2d 868 (1972). The court in Jaworski
reasoned that the language and logic of the Boykin opinion require that "the defendant must
be informed of these three rights, for without knowledge he cannot understandingly waiver
[sic] those rights." Id. at 29, 194 N.W.2d at 871.
Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that
the fourth amendment does not necessarily require the state to prove that the one giving
permission to a search knew that he had a right to withhold consent. But the Court noted in
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jurisdictions have gone beyond Boykin to require that the defendant
be informed of certain additional constitutional rights which he waives
upon pleading guilty, such as the right to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.
3 4
A final area of inquiry concerns a determination of the factual basis
for the plea. Until recently, few jurisdictions had such a requirement,35
but several jurisdictions currently require that the trial judge establish
a factual basis for the plea before it is accepted. 6 This requirement is
usually fulfilled if the trial court elicits facts from the defendant about
what he did which leads him to believe that he is guilty of the charge, 7
but it has been suggested that this requirement may also be satisfied by
such other means as questioning the prosecuting attorney or examining
the pre-sentence report.
3 8
II. STANDARDS FOR ACCEPTING GUILTY PLEAS IN
MISDEMEANORS
A. State of the Law
The same standard of voluntariness and understanding applies to
the acceptance of guilty pleas in misdemeanor as well as felony cases.
dictum that the knowledge of the rights being waived is required when various trial-related
rights are being waived. Id. at 237-38.
3' See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1204(c) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1974); MICH. GEN. CT. R.
785.7(l)(d)(iii); OHio R. CRIM. P. I I(C)(2)(c).
In dissenting from a denial of certiorari, Justice Douglas suggested that enumeration of
certain trial related rights, in addition to those expressly enumerated in Boykin, may be
required. Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924 (1974), cert. denied (Douglas, J., dissenting).
'5 See Erickson, supra note 16, at 838; ABA STANDARDS, supra note.4, § 1.6, Commen-
tary.
36 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968); State v. LeGear, 187
Neb. 763, 193 N.W.2d 763 (1972); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. I I(f); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 17.3; ILL. S.
CT. R. 402(c); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1205(b) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1974); ME. R. CRIM. P. I1;
MICH. GEN. CT.R. 785.7(3); N.J. CRIM. PRAC. R. 3:9-2; ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.385 (1974);
VT. R. CRIM. P. 11(f); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.2(d); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.08(l)(b)
(1971). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 1.6. The purpose of
the factual basis requirement has been stated as follows:
Such inquiry should, e.g., protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading
voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without
realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within this charge.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Advisory Committee Note.
The inquiry as to a factual basis may be constitutionally required when a guilty plea is
entered, coupled with a claim of innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
31 See People v. Hudson, 7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 803, 288 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1972); State v.
LeGear, 187 Neb. 763, 766, 193 N.W.2d 763, 765 (1972).
3' See People v. Hudson, 7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 803, 288 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1972); State v.
LeGear, 187 Neb. 763, 766, 193 N.W.2d 763, 765 (1972). In order to fulfill the factual basis
requirement, it is not necessary that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence. It is sufficient if there is a basis in the
record from which one could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the acts with
the intent required to constitute the offense charged. People v. Hudson, 7 111. App. 3d at 803,
288 N.E.2d at 535.
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Thus, a misdemeanor guilty plea is invalid if it is entered as the
result of threats, intimidation, or other forms of coercion39 or as the
result of ignorance or misapprehension.40 However, some courts have
been less concerned about procedural safeguards to insure the fulfill-
ment of this standard in misdemeanors than they have been in felonies.
In some jurisdictions, it has been held that courts have no duty to
determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea in a misdemeanor case4
or to advise the defendant about the consequences of his plea.
42
Some jurisdictions have statutes or court rules which require the
court to determine that a guilty plea is entered voluntarily and under-
standingly. Some of these statutes or court rules apply by their terms
to all criminal offenses. 43 Others apply only to felonies;44 still others
apply only to felonies and certain classes of misdemeanors.45 In addi-
tion, certain other provisions placing such a duty upon a trial court
are contained in court rules which exclude from their coverage the
lower criminal courts, where some or all misdemeanors are tried.48
39 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 241 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. 1951); State v. Stone, 101 W. Va.
53, 131 S.E. 872 (1926).
40 See, e.g., State v. Blatherwick, 238 Mo. App. 1005, 191 S.W.2d 1021 (1946).
4' E.g., People v. Barry, 23 Mich. App. 121, 178 N.W.2d 129 (1970); Albrecht v. State, 424
S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Crim. 1968).
42 E.g., Kissinger v. State, 147 Neb. 983, 25 N.W.2d 829 (1947); Foster v. State, 422
S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Crim. 1967).
43 E.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 1 l(c)-(f); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c); COLO. MUN. CT. R.P. 211;
IDAHO CRIM. PRAC. & PROC. R. 11; ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)-(d); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1204,
9-1205 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1974); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 8.08; Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.04; MO. MUN.
& TRAFF. CT. R. 37.37; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1606(e) (1969); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 174.035(1) (1973); N.J. CRIM. PRAC. R. 3:9-2; N.J. MUN. CT. R. 7:4-2(b); WASH. SUPER. CT.
CRIM. R. 4.2(d); WASH. JUST. CT. CRIM. R. 3.06(1); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 971.08(1) (1971).
44 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3210(2)-(5) (1974); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 556
(West 1967) (applies only when a defendant is not represented by counsel in a felony case);
ME. R. CRIM. P. 11.
45 E.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(b) (excludes minor traffic offenses); MICH. GEN. CT. R.
785.10 (excludes misdemeanors punishable by less than six months imprisonment); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 135.385 (1974) (applies to felonies and other charges on which the defendant
appears in person); PA. R. CRIM. P. l(a), 319(a) (excludes summary offenses tried in Philadel-
phia County; a summary offense is one so designated by the statute defining the offense or
one where the maximum punishment does not exceed ninety days' imprisonment. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 106(c) (1973)). See also OHIO R. CRIM. P. 11, which requires a trial judge to
make extensive inquiries when a defendant enters a guilty plea to a felony but less extensive
inquiries when a defendant enters a guilty plea to a serious misdemeanor or a petty offense.
46 E.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 1, 11; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.010, Committee Note
(excludes municipal courts), 1.170(a); VT. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(c)-(f), 54(a)(l) (excludes police
courts); VA. R. CRIM. PRAC. & PROC. 3A: 1 l(c) (excludes courts not of record); Wyo. R.
CRIM. P. 15, 5 1(a) (excludes municipal and justice of the peace courts).
Jurisdictions such as Maine and Michigan, which specifically exclude misdemeanors or
certain classes of misdemeanors from the provisions requiring the trial court to determine if
the guilty plea was voluntarily and understandingly entered, could also be placed in this
category because the court rules containing this provision are not applicable to the lower
criminal courts. ME. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(2); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 11.1.
The Federal Rule might also be placed in this category. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 applies by its
terms to all criminal offenses, but Rule 54(b)(4) excludes proceedings involving minor
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In a number of jurisdictions, it is difficult to determine the actual
procedures followed in the lower courts, because of the existence of
provisions for a trial de novo upon appeal from a conviction in such
"inferior" courts.47 The effect of such a trial de novo provision is that
any errors committed by the lower court are erased from the record
and that the defendant is tried anew in the court of general jurisdic-
tion.48 It follows that in these jurisdictions, the procedures used by the
lower criminal courts for accepting guilty pleas in misdemeanors are
not effectively monitored by the appellate courts of the state. 49 Com-
mentators who have studied the lower criminal courts have noted that
in many such courts the trial judge does not ascertain whether a guilty
plea is voluntarily and knowingly entered.50
B. Impact of Boykin
One state court has expressly rejected the application of Boykin to
"simple misdemeanors" 51 while, in similar approaches, two other
courts have found Boykin applicable only to certain more serious
offenses.52 The courts of yet another state appear to have implicitly
rejected the application of Boykin to misdemeanors. 53 On the other
offenses tried before United States magistrates. These latter proceedings are governed by the
Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses Before United States Magistrates, 400
U.S. 1037 (1971). U.S. MAGIS. R. 2(c), which governs the acceptance of guilty pleas to minor
offenses other than petty offenses, provides that the magistrate shall proceed in accordance
with the requirements of FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, while U.S. MAGIS. R. 3(b), which governs the
acceptance of guilty pleas in petty offenses, does not contain such a provision. (A minor
offense is a misdemeanor punishable by not more than one year imprisonment or a fine of not
more than $1000 or both, with certain enumerated exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(f) (1970). On
the other hand, a petty offense is a misdemeanor punishable by not more.than six months'
imprisonment or a fine of not more than $500 or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970)).
41 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS:
COURTS 160, 162 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS:
COURTS].
48 Id. at 160.
49 Id. at 162; Bing & Rosenfeld, The Quality of Justice: In the Lower Criminal Courts of
Metropolitan Boston, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 393, 399-400 (1971).
50 See Bing & Rosenfeld, supra note 49, at 425; Katz, Municipal Courts-Another Urban
Ill, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 87, 92, 95 (1968).
5' People v. Tomlinson, 50 Mich. App. 655, 213 N.W.2d 803 (1973), leave to appeal denied,
391 Mich. 824 (1974). A "simple misdemeanor" is one punishable by less than six months'
imprisonment. Id. at 657-58, 213 N.W.2d at 804-05.
52 These courts held that Boykin applies only to certain misdemeanors which carry a longer
jail sentence: Hamm v. State, 123 Ga. App. 10, 179 S.E.2d 272 (1970) (heldBoykin applicable
where the defendant was sentenced to twelve months in the public work camps on each of
two misdemeanor charges and suggested that the dividing line should be six months' impris-
onment); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969) (held Boykin applicable to felonies and
indictable misdemeanors; indictable misdemeanors are offenses punishable by fines in ex-
cess of $100 or thirty days in jail, State v. Berg, 237 Iowa 356, 21 N.W.2d 777 (1946)).
13 Texas seems to have implicitly rejected Boykin's applicability to misdemeanors. In
Buchanan v. State, 480 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 814 (1972),
the court stated that it was leaving this question open; it found Boykin to have been complied
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hand, three state courts have expressly held that Boykin applies to all
misdemeanors,54 and a few other courts have so held by implication.55
III. SHOULD BOYKIN BE APPLIED TO MISDEMEANORS?
A. Constitutional Considerations
The Supreme Court in Boykin did not expressly limit its holding
to serious felonies, and its rationale in the case-that a guilty plea in-
volves the waiver of three important constitutional rights56-applies
equally to misdemeanors. An individual charged with a petty offense
is not entitled to a jury trial57 because of the peculiar history of that
right.58 But the necessary implication of various Supreme Court de-
cisions is that the other two rights emphasized in Boykin-the right of
confrontation and the right against self-incrimination-clearly apply
to misdemeanors. For example, in District of Columbia v. Clawans,59
the Supreme Court held that the offense with which the defendant
was charged-dealing in secondhand property without a license, pun-
ishable by a fine of not more than $3.00 or imprisonment for not
more than ninety days-was a petty offense to which the jury trial right
did not apply. Nevertheless, the Court reversed the defendant's con-
viction because the trial judge had prejudicially restricted the de-
with in that case. However, other Texas cases, without expressly mentioning Boykin, have
rejected the basic thrust of the decision. There is a long line of Texas cases holding that a
court has no duty to advise a defendant of the consequences of his plea in a misdemeanor
case, and these cases have been reaffirmed after Boykin. See Johnson v. State, 492 S.W.2d
955 (Tex. Crim. 1973); Whelan v. State, 472 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. 1971).
-1 Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1973); City of
Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 278 N.E.2d 374 (1972); Crew v. Nelson,
-S.D.-, 216 N.W.2d 565 (1974).
,5 A few courts have applied Boykin to offenses which are classified as misdemeanors
without expressly discussing the applicability of Boykin to misdemeanors. E.g., Taylor v.
State, -Ind. App.-, 297 N.E.2d 896 (1973) (vagrancy); State v. Casarez, 295 Minn. 534, 203
N.W.2d 406 (1973) (unlawfully tampering with a motor vehicle); State v. Harris, 10 N.C.
App. 553, 180 S.E.2d 29 (1971) (driving while intoxicated and driving with license revoked).
Another case that might be placed in this category is McCall v. State, 9 Md. App. 191, 263
A.2d 19 (1970). In applyingBoykin, the court in McCall recognized that the offense charged
was a misdemeanor and stated that this should not change the result. However, it is unclear
whether the court would apply Boykin to all misdemeanors because the defendant in McCall
was charged with multiple counts of obtaining money and goods by false pretenses, punish-
able on each count by imprisonment of up to eighteen months or by fine of up to $500. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 142 (1957).
56 See text accompanying note 31 supra. These three rights are now applicable to the states
by reason of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968) (right to ajury trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront
one's accusers); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination).
5 See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
5 See text accompanying notes 115-116 infra.
59 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
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fendant's right of cross-examination, a right protected by the sixth
amendment confrontation clause. 60 In Schmerber v. California," the
Supreme Court held that, in a prosecution for the misdemeanor offense
of driving while intoxicated, the taking of a blood sample from the
accused over his protests did not violate his privilege against self-
incrimination, because the evidence compelled was nontestimonial in
nature. The clear implication of the decision was that the accused's
right against self-incrimination would have been violated if the evi-
dence had been testimonial in nature.
Since the right of confrontation and privilege against self-incrimina-
tion apply to all criminal offenses, the Boykin principle-based upon
these rights, as well as the right to a jury trial-should likewise apply
to all criminal offenses. The three courts that have expressly recognized
the applicability of Boykin to misdemeanors have regarded this result
as self-evident.62 For example, the California Supreme Court stated:
[T]he entry of a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor embodies the
same waiver of constitutional rights that was present in
Boykin .... The People have suggested no logical basis for con-
fining . . . [Boykin] to the felony context in which . . . [it was]
enunciated, and we can discern no rational ground for such a
distinction.
63
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court's adoption in
1971 of the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses Before
United States Magistrates must be considered. 64 These rules contain
separate provisions governing the procedures to be followed in cases
involving petty offenses65 and those involving minor offenses other
than petty offenses.66 The rule governing the acceptance of pleas in
cases involving minor offenses other than petty offenses includes a
provision 67 expressly requiring the magistrate to adhere to the pro-
cedural requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11-the
rule governing the acceptance of guilty pleas in Federal District
66 The Supreme Court cited District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937), for this
proposition in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1972). In Argersinger, the Court
stated, with respect to the right of confrontation and other rights guaranteed by the sixth
amendment, "We have never limited these rights to felonies or to lesser but serious of-
fenses." Id. at 28.
61 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
62 Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288,297-99,515 P.2d 273,279-81, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329,
335-37 (1973); City of Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 84, 278 N.E.2d 374, 378
(1972); Crew v. Nelson, -S.D.-, 216 N.W.2d 565, 566 (1974).
63 Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 299, 515 P.2d 273, 280-81, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329,
336-37 (1973).
64 400 U.S. 1029 (1971).
65 U.S. MAGIS. R. 3. See note 46 supra.
66 U.S. MAGIs. R. 2. See note 46 supra.
67 U.S. MAGIS. R. 2(c).
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Courts.6" However, no such requirement exists in the rule governing
the acceptance of pleas by magistrates in petty offense cases."0 How-
ever, the Supreme Court's adoption of the Magistrates Rules should
not be regarded as an indication that the Boykin safeguards are not
applicable to petty offenses. While the procedures required by Federal
Rule 11 and those required by Boykin are similar, not all the pro-
cedures of Federal Rule 11 are necessarily required by Boykin. In
fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that the exact procedures of
Rule 11 are not constitutionally mandated. 70 The basic thrust of
Boykin is to require an affirmative showing in the record that a guilty
plea is voluntarily and understandingly entered; neither the Supreme
Court7 nor any lower federal court has held that a magistrate can
decline to make such a showing when accepting a guilty plea in a
petty offense.
B. Policy Considerations
1. Quality of the Lower Criminal Courts-One reason for applying
Boykin to misdemeanors is that it will improve the quality of justice
dispensed in the lower criminal courts. The quality of justice in such
courts has been severely criticized by several commentators.7 2 The
lower criminal courts have been largely neglected, while society's
attention has focused on the courts of general jurisdiction where
felonies are tried. As a result, the lower courts have often failed to
attract legal personnel of the same caliber as that found in the higher
courts, 7 and many such courts lack adequate facilities and supporting
61 See note I I supra.
69 U.S. MAGiS. R. 3(b).
70 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) (dictum). But see Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 245 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71 That omission of the requirements of FED. R. CRIM. P. I I from the acceptance of guilty
pleas in petty offense cases in magistrates' courts is not predictive of the Supreme Court's
response if it is explicitly faced with the question of the extension of Boykin to misdemeanors
is illustrated by Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In that case the Supreme Court
extended the right to appointed counsel to misdemeanor cases, including petty offenses, at
least when imprisonment is imposed. U.S. MAGIS. R. 2(b), on the other hand, provides that a
defendant accused of a minoroffense other than a petty offense must be advised of his right to
appointed counsel, but makes no such provision for petty offenses.
It has been suggested that at least some of the provisions of FED. R. CRIM. P. II are
appropriate for petty offense cases heard by United States magistrates. See 8A J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3.04, at App-48 (2d ed. 1975).
72 CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 128-30; TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS, supra note I, at 29-36; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS: COURTS,
supra note 47, at 161-62; Bing & Rosenfeld, supra note 49, at 396; Dash, Cracks in the
Foundation of CrininalJustice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 386(1951); Katz, supra note 50, at 90;
Nutter, The Quality ofJusice in Misdemeanor Arraignmnent Courts, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
215, 216 (1962).
13 See CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 128; CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS: COURTSsupra note 47, at 161-62; Katz, supra note 50, at 91, 119-20.
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services. r4 The procedures used in such courts are frequently informal
and in disregard of the normal procedural safeguards required in
felonies. 75 Because of the huge volume of cases, clearing the docket
frequently becomes the main concern in these courts.76
The implementation of Boykin in the lower criminal courts will
result in an improvement over the "mass-production" justice that is
presently dispensed in many of these courts: defendants' rights are
more likely to be protected, and an adequate record for appellate
review will be developed. Moreover, the type of judicial inquiry re-
quired by Boykin provides "a dignified procedure designed to impress
the defendant with its fairness and concern for his rights. '77 Since the
vast majority of citizens who come into contact with the American
system of criminal justice do so in the lower criminal courts,78 the type
of inquiry contemplated by Boykin will enhance community respect
for law enforcement.
2. Severity of the Consequences-One argument that has been ad-
vanced for not applying Boykin to misdemeanors is that since the
possible consequences to the defendant are less severe, the same pro-
cedural safeguards are not necessary. 79 But conviction for any criminal
offense is a serious event for any person. As the Supreme Court has
observed:
[T]he prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will
seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or "petty" matter
and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his
career and his reputation. 0
74 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS: COURTS, supra note 47, at 162.
75 See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 1, at 30-31.
76 See CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 128; TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 1, at 31; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS:
COURTS, supra note 47, at 162.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has
characterized the lower criminal courts:
The Commission has been shocked by what it has seen in some lower courts. It
has seen cramped and noisy courtrooms, undignified and perfunctory proce-
dures, and badly trained personnel. It has seen dedicated people who are
frustrated by huge caseloads, by the lack of opportunity to examine cases
carefully, and by the impossibility of devising constructive solutions to the
problems of offenders. It has seen assembly line justice.
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 128. As a solution to this problem,
it has been recommended that the lower criminal courts be abolished and be replaced with a
single court system which would handle all offenses. Id. at 129; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS: COURTS, supra note 47, at 164-66. It has been suggested that if it is not
feasible to completely unify the court system at the present time, then a temporary solution
might be to establish a statewide system of lower courts to replace the municipal and
justice-of-the-peace courts. Id. at 162.
71 Hoffman, Rule 11 and the Plea of Guilty, 45 F.R.D. 151 (1969).
78 See CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 128.
79 People v. Tomlinson, 50 Mich. App. 655, 658-59, 213 N.W.2d 803, 805 (1973).
80 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
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Perhaps the most serious consequence of a misdemeanor conviction
is the impact that it may have upon the defendant's employment. Im-
prisonment for thirty days may result in the loss of employment;"'
and even if the defendant does not have to serve a jail sentence, his
criminal record may adversely affect his future employment oppor-
tunities. 2 Moreover, disqualification from licensed professions 3 or
from public employment,8" a consequence usually associated with
felonies, may attach to misdemeanors involving moral turpitude.85
Certain misdemeanors involve social stigma8 6 and therefore may
affect one's reputation. In addition, misdemeanor convictions in some
jurisdictions are admissible to impeach one's credibility as a
witness. 87
3. Complexity of the Charge-It has also been argued that the
Boykin safeguards should not apply to misdemeanors because such
offenses are simple and easily understood.8 8 While misdemeanors such
as minor traffic offenses are simple in nature, the same can not be said
for others. For example, misdemeanors which have felony counter-
parts-simple assault and petty larceny-often involve the same factual
and legal issues as the felonies to which they correspond.89 Moreover,
many defendants charged with such offenses have little or no criminal
history" and are more likely to be confused and unfamiliar with court
practices than are criminal repeaters.
4. Right to Counsel-It might be argued that the Supreme Court's
81 See Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Va. 1971).
82 See A. TREBACH, TIE RATIONING OF JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE CRIMI-
NAL PROCESS 70-71 (1964); Kamisar & Choper, supra note 14, at 78. See also Schwartz &
Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 133, 134-36 (1962), in which the
authors discussed the results of a field experiment conducted in the Catskill resort area of
New York state. In this study, four employment folders were prepared which differed only in
the applicant's criminal record, and each folder was shown to twenty-five prospective
employers of unskilled hotel workers. Of the twenty-five employers shown the folder of the
applicant convicted of assault, only one gave a positive response, while of the twenty-five
employers shown the folder of the applicant with no criminal record, nine expressed interest.
83 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 16 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (architects); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 3094 (1974) (optometrists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-4(b) (1965) (real estate brokers).
See generally Comment, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 929 (1970).
84 See, e.g., Raphalides v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service, 80 N.J. Super. 407,
194 A.2d 1 (1963) (bookkeeping machine operator dismissed after conviction for petty
larceny).
85 See Comment, supra note 83, at 959-60.
86 It has been suggested that driving while intoxicated involves social stigma. See James v.
Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 1969); Kamisar & Choper, supra note 14, at 70 n.293.
87 See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
88 People v. Tomlinson, 50 Mich. App. 655, 658-59, 213 N.W.2d 803, 805 (1973).
89 See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note I, at 53, 55. See also Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972).
90 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS: COURTS, supra note 47, at 161.
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extension of the right to appointed counsel to misdemeanors where im-
prisonment is imposed 9' adequately safeguards the rights of the ac-
cused, including those rights associated with guilty pleas.92 But not
all defendants charged with misdemeanors are represented by counsel;
appointment of counsel under Argersinger is necessary only if im-
prisonment will actually be imposed.9 Moreover, some defendants
who plead guilty voluntarily waive their right to counsel before enter-
ing their plea.1
4
Even assuming that many defendants charged with misdemeanors
do in fact receive appointed counsel, representation by counsel does
not eliminate the need for the trial judge to ascertain whether a guilty
plea is voluntarily and knowingly entered. The Supreme Court in-
validated Boykin's plea in spite of his representation by counsel.95
Prior to Boykin, a number of jurisdictions held that if a defendant is
represented by counsel, the trial judge has no duty to determine
whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered,96 but several
of these jurisdictions have reversed their position.97 Most have done
so in the felony context, but their rationale applies equally to mis-
demeanors.
There are two major methods of providing appointed counsel for
indigents: assigned counsel systems and public defender systems.9 s
Neither fully protects defendants who plead guilty. It has been con-
tended that many assigned counsel are unfamiliar with the criminal
process; 9' some therefore use the guilty plea as a quick way out.100 In
91 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
92 See People v. Tomlinson, 50 Mich. App. 655, 659, 213 N.W.2d 803, 805 (1973).
'3 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
'4 See D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 203.
"' Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 239 (1969).
96 See, e.g., People v. Mendez, 27 Cal. 2d 20, 161 P.2d 929 (1945); State v. Tipton, 78 N.M.
600, 435 P.2d 430 (1967); Application of Dutro, 83 S.D. 168, 156 N.W.2d 771 (1968); State v.
Strickland, 27 Wis. 2d 623, 135 N.W.2d 295 (1965).
97 See, e.g., In re Tahl, I Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969); Nachtigall v.
Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 178 N.W.2d 198 (1970); Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661,170 N.W.2d 713
(1969). But see Price v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 328, 502 P.2d 121 (1972).
" See I L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTS 15-74 (1965); LaFrance, Criminal Defense Systems for the Poor, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 41, 58-62 (1974).
'9 See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 1, at 57; Note, The Representation of
Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 596
(1963).
199 See A. TREBACH, supra note 82, at 148. In a recent survey of 3,400 criminal justice
practitioners, 61 percent felt that it was probable or somewhat probable that most defense
attorneys "engage in plea bargaining primarily to expedite the movement of cases," while 38
percent felt that it was probable or somewhat probable that most defense attorneys engaged
in plea bargaining "pressure client[s] into entering a plea that the client feels is unsatisfac-
tory." PROJECT STAR, SURVEY OF ROLE PERCEPTIONS FOR OPERATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PERSONNEL: DATA SUMMARY, 238, 243 (1972) cited in CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS: COURTS, supra note 47, at 43.
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public defender systems, the excessive caseload carried by many of
the defenders limits the amount of time that can be spent on each
case;101 this is especially true with respect to misdemeanors:
10 2
Often, too, the total representation in these minor cases involves
no more than a short, in-court conference with the client a few
minutes before he enters his guilty plea. The contribution of this
type of representation in insuring accurate guilty pleas is minimal
if it makes much difference at all.
10 3
5. Burden upon the Courts-Some state courts have held that
extending Boykin, as it has been interpreted in the felony context, to
misdemeanors would place too great a burden upon the extremely
crowded municipal courts. 1 4 It is contended that too much time will
be consumed if the judge is required to question each misdemeanor
defendant as extensively as is required in felony cases. 105 However,
this is inapplicable to many of the courts which hear misdemeanors.
An adequate inquiry can be conducted by the judge in less than ten
minutes, 0 6 an amount of time which courts in cities of low to moderate
population should be able to afford. In fact, some such courts already
do follow this procedure.
10 7
101 See LaFrance, supra note 98, at 92-97.
Another criticism of public defenders is that they lack independence because of their
continuing relationship with the criminal court system, but the validity of this criticism has
been seriously questioned. See 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 98, at 50-52; Junker, The Right
to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 697-703 (1968).
102 See LaFrance, supra note 98, at 94-95.
103 D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 204. The standard which courts use in determining
whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is that ineffective
assistance of counsel means "representation so lacking in competence that it becomes the
duty of the court ... to correct it, so as to prevent a mockery ofjustice." Commonwealth ex.
rel. Crosby v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 81, 87, 202 A.2d 299, 303 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 976
(1965). Courts have generally held that the mere fact that counsel was not appointed until
shortly before the defendant entered his plea does not itself establish ineffective assistance of
counsel. See, e.g., Keehn v. State, 221 So. 2d 26 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969) (ten minutes); Turley v.
State, 439 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1969) (fifteen to thirty minutes).
104 See Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 302-07, 515 P.2d 273, 283-87, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 339-43 (1973); City of Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 90-91, 278
N.E.2d 374, 382 (1972); Crew v. Nelson, -S.D.-, 216 N.W.2d 565, 567 (1974).
101 See Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 302-07, 515 P.2d 273, 283-87, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 339-43 (1973); City of Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 90-91, 278
N.E.2d 374, 382 (1972); Crew v. Nelson, -S.D.-, 216 N.W.2d 565, 567 (1974).
106 See Erickson, supra note 16, at 848-49.
107 In the early part of January, 1975, the author observed the disposition of misdemeanor
cases in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Judicial Districts in Washtenaw County, Michigan
(Ann Arbor and Ypsilanti). MICH. GEN. CT. R. 785.7, the provision requiring the trial judge to
make inquiries of the defendant about whether the guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly
entered, specifically excludes misdemeanors punishable by less than six months' imprison-
ment (MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 785.10), while the District Court Rules do not have a comparable
provision. Nevertheless, all the judges observed made extensive inquiries of the defendants
before accepting guilty pleas in order to insure that the pleas were entered voluntarily and
knowingly. One of thejudges closely followed MICH. GEN. CT. R. 785.7, though not required
to do so, while the others followed most of the provisions of this rule.
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 8:568
On the other hand, the municipal courts in some of the large metro-
politan areas, beset with burgeoning caseloads and an insufficient
number of judges, might have difficulty spending additional time with
each defendant.1"8 While the ultimate solution is to increase the num-
ber of judges,' °9 an interim solution involving the use of forms
embodying the required information may be acceptable to fulfill the
requirements of Boykin.1 '
IV. SHOULD THERE BE A DIVIDING LINE?
It would be possible to extend Boykin to certain classes of mis-
demeanors but not to others. This part will consider the merit of dis-
criminating among classes of misdemeanors for the purpose of guilty
plea standards.
A. Petty Offense Criteria
One possible dividing line may be provided by the petty offense
criteria used in determining the applicability of the right to a jury
trial under the United States Constitution."' The Supreme Court has
held that an offense punishable by in excess of six months' imprison-
ment is a nonpetty offense for jury trial purposes." 2 The Supreme
Court has not definitely ruled out the possibility that some offenses,
because of their inherent gravity, may be entitled to a jury trial
even though punishable by less than six months' imprisonment. But
in deciding whether an offense is a petty offense for jury trial pur-
poses, it has stressed the possible length of imprisonment" 3 and has
108 An example of such a city is Detroit, Michigan. In 1973, 10,230 misdemeanor cases
were handled by a single judge presiding over the Misdemeanor Division of the Recorder's
Court. 1973 RECORDER'S COURT ANN. REP. 1, 6. In the early part of January, 1975, the author
observed the proceedings in the Misdemeanor Division of the Recorder's Court. Because of
the large volume of cases, the inquiries about voluntariness and understanding were gener-
ally not made. Since the judge presiding over the Misdemeanor Division rotates monthly, the
procedures followed may vary somewhat, but at the time the author observed the proceed-
ings the normal procedure was for the defendant's attorney to state that he had advised the
defendant of his constitutional rights, for the judge or prosecuting attorney to read the
essential allegations of the complaint, and for the defendant to enter his plea.
,09 It is difficult to estimate the financial burden of increasing the number ofjudges so as to
fully comply with Boykin in misdemeanors. However, the financial burden is probably
significantly less than that of providing appointed counsel to indigent misdemeanor defen-
dants. Some communities may be able to meet the standard without an increase in judicial
manpower.
o10 See part V B infra.
"I This is the standard suggested by the court in Hamm v. State, 123 Ga. App. 10, 179
S.E.2d 272 (1970), and is, in effect, also the standard adopted by the court in People v.
Tomlinson, 50 Mich. App. 655, 213 N.W.2d 803 (1973), though stated in different terms in
that case.
112 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
,,3 Id. at 68-69; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
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held that imprisonment for a period of six months or less is sufficiently
short to deny the jury trial right.114 The reason for adopting this stan-
dard to limit the jury trial right is largely historical. At the time the
Federal Constitution was drafted, petty offenses were tried without a
jury in the states," 5 and it has been said that the framers of the Con-
stitution intended to retain this practice and limit the jury trial
guarantee to more serious offenses.116 However, similar historical
reasons have not been advanced for limiting the other constitutional
rights upon which Boykin is based-the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and the right of confrontation. 17 Therefore, the jury trial
standard is not determinative of the issue here.
Another justification which has been offered for limiting the right
to a jury trial is that a fair trial can be obtained without a jury, since
the jury trial right is "brigaded with a system of trial to the judge
alone"'1 -i.e., many defendants waive a jury trial and receive a fair
hearing before a judge alone. However, in this regard, the Boykin
principle is essentially different because it is designed to ensure the
fairness of the guilty plea process itself. In a trial, there are various
safeguards to insure that a defendant is convicted only if actually
guilty; many of the rules of evidence are designed to screen out un-
trustworthy evidence,119 and the prosecutor has the burden of proving
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 2° However, in a
guilty plea, the defendant is himself admitting his guilt.12" '
B. Actual Imprisonment Standard
Another possible dividing line is the actual imprisonment standard
adopted by the Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin 2 to define
the extent of the right to appointed counsel. The Court in Argersinger
114 Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Cheffv. Schnackenberg, 384
U.S. 373 (1966).
"I See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625-27 (1937); Frankfurter &
Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
HARV. L. REV. 917, 934-65 (1926).
116 See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904); Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra
note 115, at 968-75.
117 Cf. Junker, supra note 101, at 705-06; James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 333 (5th Cir.
1969).
11s Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29 (1972). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 158 (1968).
119 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 87, § 245.
12 0 1d. § 341.
zI It has been said of a guilty plea, "More is not required; the court has nothing to do but
give judgment and sentence." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
122 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Such a dividing line was suggested by the State of California in Mills
v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 299, 515 P.2d 273, 281, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 337 (1973).
SPRING 1975]
Journal of Law Reform
stated that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense"' 123 unless
represented by counsel. In order to decide whether to appoint counsel
under this standard, the trial judge must make an evaluation of each
case to determine whether there is any likelihood that a jail sentence
will be imposed if the defendant is convicted.' 24
A similar standard should not be adopted to limit the application of
the Boykin principle. As a practical matter it will be extremely difficult
for a judge to determine, before a defendant enters his plea, whether
imprisonment would be an appropriate penalty. 2 5 The difficulties in-
volved in making such a determination may be worthwhile in deciding
whether to appoint counsel, since the appointment of counsel involves
significant state expense and court delay. 126 But the additional expense
is not a relevant consideration in deciding whether to apply Boykin,
since the additional inquiries by the judge obviously would not impose
as great a burden on the state or court system as would the cost of
counsel.' 27
C. Exclusion of the Lower Criminal Courts
Another possible dividing line is to apply Boykin in all but the
lower criminal courts. 2 In about half the jurisdictions, a defendant
convicted in a lower criminal court has a right to a trial de novo on
appeal in a court of general jurisdiction, 2 9 and in many such states, a
trial de novo is allowed as a matter of course even following a guilty
plea. 30 It might be argued that in such jurisdictions, the Boykin safe-
guards would not be necessary in the lower court because the
defendant would be assured of all procedural safeguards in a trial de
novo on appeal. This might be true if the appeals were commonly
taken. But the vast majority of defendants convicted in the lower
123 407 U.S. at 37(1972). However, the Court expressly left open the question whether the
right to appointed counsel extended to cases not involving imprisonment. Id.
124 1d. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
125 Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 301, 515 P.2d 273, 281, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 337
(1973). For problems in interpreting the proper standard to apply under Argersinger, see
Wood v. Superintendent Caroline Correctional Unit, 355 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1973);
Gilliard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
126 Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 301,515 P.2d 273, 281, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 337
(1973).
127 Id.
128 This is, in effect, the standard used by those jurisdictions cited in note 46 supra.
129 See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE3 & n.e (4th
ed. 1974).
13 See, e.g., State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 93 Ariz. 351, 380 P.2d 1009
(1963); Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.2d 950 (Ky. 1959); State v. Hungary, 75 Wyo.
423, 296 P.2d 506 (1956). But some jurisdictions limit the scope of review on appeal from a
plea of guilty in an inferior criminal court to collateral questions such as propriety of the
sentence imposed. See, e.g., State v. Stoesser, 55 Del. 70, 183 A.2d 824 (1962); State v. Mull,
30 N.J. 231, 152 A.2d 572 (1959).
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criminal courts never appeal13 1 and thus are not accorded the pro-
tection of a trial de novo.
132
Also, it is questionable whether a constitutional right can be initially
denied and then preserved on an appeal in a trial de novo. The Su-
preme Court held in Callan v. Wilson13 that, in a prosecution for a
nonpetty offense, a defendant who was denied a trial by jury in the
first instance but allowed a jury on appeal in a trial de novo was
effectively denied the right to a jury trial.1 34 Reasoning by analogy, it
might be argued that other constitutional rights may not be initially
denied and then preserved on an appeal in a trial de novo. Such an
analysis would apply to Boykin because it is based upon the waiver of
three fundamental constitutional rights.
135
D. Inclusion of All Misdemeanors
Except for Minor Traffic Offenses
Another possible classification includes all misdemeanors except
for minor traffic offenses. Under this approach, the more serious traffic
offenses, such as driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an
accident, would be accorded the Boykin safeguards, but minor traffic
offenses, such as exceeding the speed limit and failure to stop at a stop
sign, would be excluded. This would appear to be the appropriate
dividing line. Serious traffic offenses may result in social stigma, 136
the loss of a driver's license,' and possibly the imposition of a jail
131 See Bing & Rosenfeld, supra note 49, at 400; Note, Metropolitan Criminal Courts of
First Instance, 70 HARV. L. REv. 320, 349 (1956).
13 It has been argued that the existence of a trial de novo system is one of the most
significant barriers to improving the quality of the lower criminal courts because an appellate
court never effectively reviews the procedures followed by the lower court. See Bing &
Rosenfeld, supra note 49, at 399-401; CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS: COURTS,
supra note 47, at 162.
133 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
134 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540(1888), was decided before the sixth amendment right to
ajury trial was held applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
The Supreme Court has heard oral arguments in a case in which it will decide whether the
states are required to adhere to this aspect of the federal jury trial right. Costarelli v.
Massachusetts, 16 CRIM. L. REP. 4220 (March 19, 1975) (No. 73-6739). It can be argued that
the rule in Callan is still viable even though the Supreme Court, in applying the sixth
amendment to the states, has held that two other traditional aspects of the federal jury trial
right are no longer required: the twelve-person jury (Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970))
and jury unanimity (Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)). Williams and Apodaca dealt
with what a "jury" is for the purposes of the sixth amendment, while Callan dealt with the
denial of a jury altogether in an initial proceeding. See generally Hasler, De Novo Juries,
Misdemeanor Counsel and Other Problems: Changes Ahead for the Maine District Courts?
23 ME. L. REV. 63 (1971)).
135 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
131 See James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 334(5th Cir. 1969); Kamisar& Choper, supra note
14, at 70 n.293.
131 See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 14, at 70 n.293.
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sentence. 13 Minor traffic offenses, on the other hand, are not viewed
by society as truly criminal in nature; 139 moreover, since the number
of individuals charged with traffic offenses vastly exceeds the number
charged with other misdemeanors, 40 the burden on the courts would
be too great. Comparable considerations do not apply to any other
class of misdemeanors.
14
V. SHOULD FELONY STANDARDS BE APPLIED TO
MISDEMEANORS?
A. The Major Inquiries
Since the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is largely
artificial,'42 the inquiries made in misdemeanor cases should be similar
to those made in felony cases.
43
1. Understanding of the Charge-As with felonies, the first area of
inquiry after the defendant pleads guilty to a misdemeanor should
concern the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charges. 44
In many jurisdictions where judges do not inquire extensively into
whether a guilty plea is voluntarily and knowingly entered, the defen-
dant is at least informed of the basic allegations of the complaint. 145
However, more extensive inquiry is warranted in some cases. For in-
stance, it would be desirable to advise the defendant of the essential
elements of the. offense charged, 146 particularly when the offense, such
as petty larceny or worthless check violations, requires a specific
intent.
2. Voluntariness of the Plea-The defendant should be asked
138 See Junker, supra note 101, at 711.
'39 See James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 1969); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS: COURTS, supra note 47, at 169.
140 There are 4 to 5 million nontraffic misdemeanor prosecutions annually. See TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note I, at 55. On the other hand, there are an estimated 40
to 50 million traffic offenses annually. See Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to
Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1261 (1970).
14! Another offense which might arguably be excluded is public intoxication. As with
traffic offenses, the number of individuals charged with this offense is considerable. See
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 233. However, unlike cases of
minor traffic violations, social stigma may attach to a conviction of public drunkenness, and a
jail sentence may be imposed. Id. at 233-35. See also R. NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECES-
SARY ARRESTS (1971).
141 See notes 79-90 and accompanying text supra.
143 See Part I supra. Not all the specific inquiries discussed in this section are constitution-
ally required; rather, they are the desirable means of creating the constitutionally mandated
record of voluntariness and understanding.
114 See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
145 This conclusion is based upon the author's observations of the proceedings in the
Misdemeanor Division of the Recorder's Court in Detroit, Michigan.
146 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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whether he is entering his plea voluntarily and whether his plea was
the result of any threats or promises.14 It might be contended that a
requirement of disclosure of the terms of a plea bargain in open
court'48 is not needed because there is little plea bargaining in many
cases involving petty offenses. 149 But there are some offenses which
involve conduct for which either a felony or misdemeanor could be
charged, at the prosecutor's discretion. 5 ' In many such cases, the
prosecutor may agree to dismiss a felony charge in exchange for a
guilty plea to a misdemeanor. 15' Such an agreement should be stated
in the record and would eliminate any need for the defendant to be
"coached" in advance as to how to answer the court's questions about
the existence of any promises.
5 2
3. Consequences of the Plea-The defendant should be advised of
the maximum punishment 53 because, no matter what the offense
charged, an individual can not make an intelligent decision about
whether to plead guilty unless he is aware of the possible sentence. On
the other hand, the defendant should not ordinarily have to be advised
of collateral consequences such as the loss of employment opportuni-
ties, for it would be too difficult for the judge to determine such conse-
quences in each case. 54 However, one collateral consequence of which
the defendant should be advised is the revocation of a driver's license
upon conviction for certain motor vehicle offenses. 5 If the revocation
of the license is mandatory upon conviction for a certain offense, the
court could inform the defendant of this consequence without having
to examine the background of each defendant. Knowledge of the cer-
tainty of such revocation might well affect an individual's decision
See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
148 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
149 See CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 134.
150 Id.
"I See Bing & Rosenfeld, supra note 49, at 433-34. For a discussion of prosecutorial
discretion in general, see F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME (1970); Kaplan, The ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Comment, 60Nw. U.L. REV.
174 (1965).
152 See note 24 supra.
l~ See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
154 See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
155 Some jurisdictions have statutes which require a court to advise a defendant of the
mandatory revocation of his driver's license upon conviction for certain offenses. E.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.44 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 170.10(4)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1974). However, courts in jurisdictions which do not have such statutes
have held that it is not necessary to advise a defendant of the revocation of his driver's license
upon his plea of guilty to a serious motor vehicle offense. See, e.g., People v. Jenkins, 128 Il.
App. 2d 351, 262 N.E.2d 105 (1970); Johnson v. State, 490 P.2d 1130 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App.
1971). The court in Jenkins characterized the revocation of a driver's license as a regulatory
measure adopted under the police power of the state rather than as punishment imposed by
the court. 128 Ill. App. 2d at 354-55, 262 N.E.2d at 107.
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about how to plead because a driver's license is essential to the liveli-
hood of many individuals.5 6
4. Waiver of Constitutional Rights-The defendant should be ad-
vised that he waives the right of confrontation and the privilege
against self-incrimination by his guilty plea. These rights are appli-
cable to misdemeanors as well as felonies.15 7 However, in petty offense
cases, he would not have to be advised of the right to a jury trial.1 s
5. Factual Basis-Although an inquiry about factual basis for the
plea 1 9 is the most time consuming of the suggested inquiries, 160 it
serves the same important function in misdemeanors as in felonies.
The inquiry is designed to insure that the defendant is guilty of a
charge at least as serious as the one to which he is pleading guilty.','
This is particularly important in the more "complex" misdemeanors,
such as assault and petty larceny, but it may also be helpful in some
simpler offenses such as loitering and vagrancy, where the conduct
which is proscribed is difficult to define.'62
B. Courtroom Procedures
In felony cases, the Boykin requirements are normally fulfilled by
the trial judge personally addressing the defendant to determine
whether his plea was voluntarily and understandingly entered.'" :
Again, the policies suggesting application of Boykin to misdemeanors
indicate that this procedure should be required in those cases as well.
Certain goals of the inquiry, such as determining whether the defen-
dant understands the nature of the charge, can not be adequately ac-
complished without oral questioning. If the defendent hesitates or in-
dicates in some other way that he does not understand, the judge can
direct additional inquiries along a particular line to assure himself of
-15 See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
's See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
' While the United States Constitution does not guarantee ajury trial to petty offenders,
many states have constitutional provisions which do. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7. In
such cases the defendant should be advised of this right.
19 See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
160 See Heberling, supra note 16, at 200-09.
'61 See note 36 supra.
'12 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
113 Many courts, in cases decided in the felony context, have held that Boykin requires
such a personal examination of the defendant by the trial judge. See, e.g., State v. Sisco, 169
N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969); State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971); Bishop v.
Langlois, 106 R.I. 56,256 A.2d 20 (1969); McBain v. Maxwell, 2 Wash. App. 27, 466 P.2d 177
(1970). In addition, many of the statutes or court rules which were adopted in response to
Boykin require the court to personally address the defendant. E.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P.
1(c); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2; ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1204 (Burns Cum.
Supp. 1974); MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 785.7(1); Ofio R. CRIM. P. I l(C)(2)(a); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 135.385(l) (1974); VT. R. CRIM. P. Il(c).
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the defendant's comprehension. Use of personal inquiries may be par-
ticularly appropriate where a defendant has a low level of intellectual
or educational attainment.
164
Conceding that there are an inadequate number of judges in the
municipal courts of some large metropolitan areas, alternative pro-
cedures may be permissible as an interim solution until judicial man-
power is increased. Such alternative procedures should require the




1. Group Arraignments-In some misdemeanor courts, defendants
charged with misdemeanors are advised of their constitutional rights
in large groups.166 The three courts expressly extending Boykin to
misdemeanors indicated that group arraignments may be used to
comply With Boykin in the misdemeanor context, 16 7 while, in an
analogous situation, other courts have held it permissible to use group
arraignments to advise misdemeanants of their right to counsel. 68
The use of group arraignments, however, would appear to be an in-
adequate means of complying with Boykin, there being no opportunity
for the active participation of individual defendants in dialogue with
the judge. Boykin seems to contemplate that the judge will interrogate
each defendant individually before accepting his plea.'69
2. Use of Forms-The California Supreme Court, in Mills v. Muni-
cipal Court,17 upheld the use of written forms containing the required
information as a means of complying with Boykin, and the other two
courts expressly extending Boykin to misdemeanors suggested that the
use of such forms would be acceptable.' 7 ' However, another court,
which implicitly extended Boykin to misdemeanors, disapproved of
such forms, 72 while still other courts have done so in felony cases.' 7 '
Forms have inherent weaknesses for use in determining whether a
164 Cf. D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 219.
165 See note 163 and accompanying text supra.
166 See Nutter, supra note 72, at 216; TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 1, at
30.
167 Mills v. Municipal Court, lOCal. 3d 288, 307, 515 P.2d 273, 286-87, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329,
342-43 (1973); City of Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 90-91, 278 N.E.2d 374, 382
(1972); Crew v. Nelson, -S.D.-, 216 N.W.2d 565, 567 (1974).
16' See, e.g., In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965); State v.
Simmonds, 5 Conn. Cir. 178, 247 A.2d 502 (1968).
169 See note 163 and accompanying text supra.
170 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1973).
'7' City of Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 90-91, 278 N.E.2d 374, 382 (1972);
Crew v. Nelson, -S.D.-, 216 N.W.2d 565, 567 (1974).
172 Taylor v. State, -Ind. App.-, 297 N.E.2d 896 (1973).
173 See, e.g., People v. Carle, 8 I11. App. 3d 56, 288 N.E.2d 876 (1972); People v.
Cummings, 7 111. App. 3d 306, 287 N.E.2d 291 (1972). The court in Cummings stated that the
use of such forms would "perpetuate ... contrived, rehearsed and hence, involuntary or
unintelligent pleas." Id. at 308, 287 N.E.2d at 293.
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defendant entered his plea voluntarily and understandingly because
they can not accurately reflect the defendant's state of mind and any
of his hesitations or doubts. Nevertheless, proper forms, containing all
the required information, may constitute an acceptable interim solu-
tion. In order to promote a more careful reading, such forms should
require the accused to do more than merely sign his name. As in Mills,
the forms should require the accused to participate actively by speci-
fically answering certain questions and checking or initialing various
inquiries.
174
The form should indicate the statutory section that the defendant is
charged with violating' 75 and should contain a description in layman's
terms of the offense charged, including any specific intent required.
176
The form should include questions to determine whether the defendant
is entering his plea voluntarily 17 and should require the description of
any plea agreement that has been made. 78 In addition, it should con-
tain a statement of the maximum punishment for the offense charged
79
and a list of the constitutional rights being waived. 8 ° Finally, it should
require the defendant to describe briefly in his own words what he did
that makes him think that he is guilty of the crime charged.'
3. Entry of Plea by Counsel-A number of jurisdictions allow coun-
sel for the defendant to enter a guilty plea in misdemeanor cases with-
out the defendant's presence in court.'82 Such provisions are designed
for the convenience of a defendant charged with a minor offense.183
But there are countervailing considerations which override considera-
tions of convenience. If the defendant is not present in court, the trial
judge can not "canvass" the matter with him to insure that he is enter-
ing his plea voluntarily and understandingly. In addition, the Boykin
inquiries can serve an important rehabilitative function by impressing
174 The form approved in Mills is printed in an Appendix to the opinion. 10 Cal. 3d 288,
312-13, 515 P.2d 273, 290-91, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 346-47.
175 See text accompanying note 145 supra.
176 See text accompanying note 146 supra.
177 See text accompanying note 147 supra.
7118 See text accompanying notes 148-52 supra.
179 See text accompanying note 153 supra.
180 See text accompanying note 157 supra.
18 See text accompanying notes 159-62 supra.
182 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1429 (1970); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(d); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3210(6) (Supp. 1973). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. However, some jurisdictions require
an individual to enter his plea in person in all cases. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 516
(1969); WASH. JUST. CT. CRIM. R. 3.06(1).
It is constitutionally permissible, under certain circumstances, to waive one's right to be
present at trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). It is unclear whether one can likewise
waive his right to be present for entry of a guilty plea.




the in-court defendant with the fairness of the procedure and the
court's concern for his rights;184 such a function could not be served if
the defendant does not appear in court to personally enter his plea.'85
C. Making of a Record
Boykin requires that there be an affirmative showing in the record
that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily and understandingly
entered, 18 6 but many lower criminal courts are not courts of record
and therefore do not keep stenographic transcripts of their proceed-
ings. 18 7 The required record in misdemeanor cases could be made by
the use of electronic sound recording devices in courts which deem it
impractical to keep a stenographic transcript; if a defendant decided
to appeal, his case could be transcribed from the recording. Some
jurisdictions at present permit the use of such electronic sound record-
ing devices in certain proceedings. 188 Any other possible means of
producing a record, such as notations in the docket, are inadequate
because they do not reflect the active participation of the accused and




In Boykin v. Alabama,9 ' the Supreme Court announced a new
procedural safeguard to insure that guilty pleas were voluntarily and
understandingly entered. The new rule was announced in the context
of a serious felony, but the considerations underlying the decision
apply equally to misdemeanors. Therefore, Boykin should be extended
to all misdemeanors, other than minor traffic offenses which are not
truly criminal in nature. Since the distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors is largely artificial, the procedure to insure that a guilty
plea is voluntarily and understandingly entered should be basically
the same no matter how the offense is classified.
-Richard A. Kopek
184 See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
185 The entry of a plea by counsel, accompanied by the forms involving the active
participation of the accused as discussed in text accompanyihg notes 170-81 supra may be
permissible as an interim solution in jurisdictions with insufficient judicial manpower to allow
for personal examinations of each defendant.
188 See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra.
187 See Katz, supra note 50, at 91, 117.
188 See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 1 l(g); IDAHO CRIM. PRAC. & PROC. R. Ii; MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.8331 (Supp. 1974).
189 For potential problems in using docket entries for this purpose, see In re Birch, 10 Cal.
3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1973); Katz, supra note 50, at 97.
190 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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